This paper will analyze whether the fundamental right to education is part of the primary
goods of the just society theorized by the philosopher John Rawls in his work A Theory of
Justice. To this end, it will present an overview of the theory's concepts, specifically those
named by the philosopher as fundamental in Justice as Fairness: A Reformulation. Raws aims
his theory of justice at liberal constitutional democracies, consequently reiterating that his
social model takes into account the historical achievements of human rights which, as we
shall demonstrate, are identified with the concept of "primary goods". After briefly explaining
the historical affirmation of fundamental rights and public education, we will tackle the
problem of whether the fundamental right to education is one of the primary goods in Rawls'
theory of justice. It is not intended to address pedagogical concepts since the philosopher does
not address the issue of education directly, but integrates it in an ancillary way into his theory
as a necessary element making up the social minimum to enable citizens to be free and equal
and thus be able to represent others in the original position, the abstract moment from which
Rawls' neocontractualism develops. The content of the social minimum is equated with
primary goods, elements that will be provided by the social structure to the participants in
society so that they can realize their life projects. It was shown that primary goods are
equated with fundamental rights. In the end, it was found that, given the citizen's condition to
be educated in order to be free and equal and to participate in the original position, education
is a primary good, so that, being equated with a fundamental right, the fundamental right to
education is included in the list of primary goods.

Among the most controversial and criminal policies to combat droughts promoted by the State of Ceará, Brazil, this work discusses the creation, implementation, and expansion of concentration camps, especially the Patu concentration camp in the municipality of Senador Pompeu, which aimed to confine and control refugees during three prolonged drought periods in our state history: 1877, 1915, and 1932. Placed within the context of profound denial of life, which intensively employs mechanisms of control and body management, we seek to understand the phenomenon through the framework of bionecropolitics. This framework recognizes necropolitics as the manifestation of the logic of power in Western societies, as proposed by Achille Mbembe. We will engage with the analyses promoted by the Cameroonian philosopher using his own sources. Consequently, our work will be informed by the political thought of figures such as Carl Schmitt, Walter Benjamin, Hannah Arendt, Michel Foucault, and Giorgio Agamben. The latter is given a prominent space in the second chapter to aid our dialogue with other thinkers. Agamben's biopolitical reflections lead us more directly to Mbembe's thoughts in the third chapter. This study concludes by identifying the relationships that draw necropolitics close to the issue of precarity in Judith Butler's work, understanding precariousness as a submission to the risks of death power produced by necropower. Precariousness results from the action of mechanisms that capture and politicize human existence inherent in necropolitics, which determines the value and devaluation of lives, separating them through racialization into those that deserve to live and those that deserve to die. At the end of our study, by focusing on the issue of managing grief, we conclude that necropolitics, more than enabling the death of the biological body and the fabrication of killable lives, also acts to erase these lives even after their physical death, creating lethal conditions for certain body parts of the stratagems of power in the history of Western politics.

Justice as equity is a concept presented by John Rawls in A theory of justice, a work
published in 1971. This conception aimed to propose a comprehensive Moral Philosophy
that could reform the social contract based on basic principles of a conception of justice. In
this sense, this political philosopher envisions the possibility of minimizing social conflicts –
arising from the reasonable pluralism of comprehensive doctrines – through the public
justification of basic institutions, as well as fundamental rights and duties. In 2001, thirty
years after “A theory of justice”, Rawls publishes Justice as fairness: a reformulation,
modifying the bases of his idea of justice as fairness. Given these references, this dissertation
aims to study the foundations of the Rawlsian theory of justice, since by replacing the
proposal of a comprehensive Moral Philosophy for a political conception of justice, Rawls's
theory of justice incorporates the concept of reasonableness to that of rationality, presenting
a more realistic concept of a well-ordered democratic society.

This dissertation analyzes the status of the antagonism category in the political theory of Carl Schmitt, Ernesto Laclau, and Chantal Mouffe. The dissertation consists of three chapters, each dedicated to one of the authors, which are connected by the central issue of the presence of antagonism in their political thoughts. The main goal of this study is to explain how the way antagonism is thought influences the nature of each author's political theory, from Schmitt's authoritarian sovereignty to Laclau and Mouffe's radical democracy. Additionally, we highlight the continuity and discontinuity between the authors, despite their differences in historical-political context and philosophical and political traditions. The study of antagonism is relevant due to the increasing intensity of conflicts in contemporary Western liberal democracies and the perceived crisis of legitimacy and representation in these democracies.

The general objective of this work is to analyze the concept of modern political democracy in the writings of the German thinker Max Weber (1864-1920). The hypothesis defended here is that Weberian democracy is based on a system of checks and balances between three fundamental institutions: the rational bureaucracy, the representative parliament and the plebiscitary president. This is because Weber has a vision of the conflict of values as insoluble in modernity and such institutions can give way to the conflict without, however, overcoming or suppressing it. After all, it is the dynamic between these institutions that equates the will of the electoral masses, with their multiple private interests, with the need to maintain a unity of the political body. Furthermore, in modern states, the representative regime is the only one capable of expressing the will of all those represented efficiently and objectively, so that such will can be formalized rationally through laws and bureaucratic norms.

This research seeks to resume and explain the issue of public space in Hannah Arendt, as well as her analyses of participatory political experiences with a view to plurality and dignity in the political relations of men. Our investigations propose to identify in Arendtian's work elements that enable us not only to understand contemporary political problems and to point out possible paths that can point to a dialogical and heterogeneous political structure, but also to understand the "political meaning" through which the author's considerations are directed. Elements such as the "social question", the loss of boundaries between the public and private spheres and the "victory of the animal laborans" will be analyzed in their relations with the phenomenon of the dissolution of this space. It is by understanding the causes that are at the roots of this dissolution, in contrast to the successful political experiences highlighted by the author throughout history, that we can glimpse the rescue of a dignity that situates politics beyond a mere "functionalization". In this sense, elements such as action, freedom, birth rate and novelty will guide the proposals raised here towards the resumption of this space that proves to be crucial for man to reach his highest human and political capacities.

This research is based on two fundamental concepts which pervade Jean-Paul Sartre's ontophenomenological analysis, consolidated in 1943 with the publication of L'être et le néant: freedom and intersubjectivity. In this context, the main objective of this work is to evaluate the connections and respective difficulties that surround the way in which the Other came to be interpreted amid the author's texts, acquiring a highly conflictual inclination and, thus, running the risk of entangling human relations into pure inauthenticity. Accordingly, we intend to observe how, in the 1940s and early 1950s, Sartre's work appears anchored on the concept of freedom and, at the same time, emphasize that, if conflict is the fundamental characteristic of intersubjective openness, such difficulty is only possible from a model of freedom that is absolute. In addition, since freedom is presented as a necessary condition for conflict, it will be fundamental for the coexistence between individuals not to result only in failure. In view of this, in the first chapter, supported by phenomenology, we will strive to understand the way in which Sartre conceives his concept of freedom and, at the same time, makes it synonymous with human reality. At this point, we will point to an intense dialogue with what had been produced by Hegel and Heidegger, as well as their limitations. In turn, in the second chapter, we will highlight the theory of intersubjectivity, as proposed by Sartre and, in this investigative line, we will face the problem of solipsism that, for the French philosopher, remained neglected by the recent philosophical tradition. Still at this stage, we will use the theatrical play Huis clos in order to underline the aspects that allow a glimpse of Sartrian intersubjectivity as something conflicting. In the third chapter, continuing the perspective of intersubjectivity, we will have the necessary space to see the role played by corporeality which, in this sense, is not limited to the dimension of subjectivity and, consequently, suffers the impact of the encounter with the Other. In the fourth chapter, we will investigate the occurrence of concrete relationships in which human reality is inserted and, thus, first, we will observe love, language and masochism; that is, the relational type in which the For-itself strives to limit the transcendence that comes from the Other. Next, still in the same chapter, we will analyse the second relational type, which consists of the For-itself's attempt to build its subjectivity in view of the collapse of the Other's transcendence. At the end of chapter four, we will underline some notes related to collectivity, especially Sartre's critique of Heidegger’s concept of Mitsein. Finally, in the fifth chapter, we will return to the Sartrian concept of freedom, but, unlike what was addressed in chapter one, we will take into account being-free in relation to the most diverse situations in which it is inserted, including placing the Other as an inseparable part of the situational plan. Furthermore, with the purpose of glimpsing the fact that the conflict does not represent a dramatic drop in inauthenticity, we will use existential psychoanalysis as a support tool; that is, taking into account the outlook that Sartre elaborates on the poet Jean Genet, we will be in a comfortable position to show that the For-itself is constructed and reconstructed indefinitely, even in the most adverse situations

The purpose of this dissertation is to highlight the correlation between the two activities of the arendtian spirit that are thinking and judgment and how the faculty of reinterpreted kantian judgment by Hannah Arendt is the fundamental basis for the development of the activity of political judgment. Our aim is to discuss the faculty of judging which is the most political of all. according to Hannah Arendt, because the connection between thought and judgment is the support of space public. If the faculty of the mind, thought, deals with reflection, the faculty of judgment will dealing with actions in the lifeworld. In this way, Arendt appropriates the Kantian concepts, made explicit in the Critique of Judgment and interprets them as fundamental concepts of political judgments. Thus, we intend to delimit the function of the spectator as well as his importance in the foundation of Arendt's political philosophy. In her texts, Arendt points out for the tangible importance of spectators, they occupy a crucial position, as they have the vision of the whole in an impartial and disinterested way. They are the ones who, through the exercise of thinking can demonstrate to the actors the capital importance of the subject who reflects and judges the ordinary events in the game of community life. In this way, every human being brings in its very existence the original possibility of the plurality of being an actor and spectator in the game of the world, since it is only through the exercise of thinking and judging that the doors are opened to the plurality of discourses and consequently thoughtlessness is banished.

The present research project has as its object the problem related to the principle of contradiction expressed in the notion of non-being of Gorgias of Leontini, as it is presented in the "Against the Mathematicians", by Sextus Empiricus, and in the text of the anonymous author “ Melisso Xenophanes and Gorgias” (MXG). The Gorgian non-being is opposed to the metaphysical principles of identity and non-contradiction that are born with the notion of being expressed in Parmenides of Elea's “On Nature”. The Gorgian notions of being and non-being are considered to correspond to a “reverse mirror” that will provide an inversion of the adequacy between being, thinking and saying, as this adequacy is postulated by Eleatic intuitions.

This study focuses on the right to exist of transgender individuals, emphasizing the importance of plurality as the fundamental law of the land. Through an interdisciplinary approach, various aspects related to sexual and gender diversity are explored.The first chapter introduces essential concepts, such as gender identity and sexual orientation, as well as queer theory, which questions binary norms and categories of gender. The terms transgender and cisgender, referring to those who do not identify with the gender assigned at birth and those who do respectively, are also emphasized. Drawing from Judith Butler's critical perspective, the construction of gender as a heteronormative matrix, the deconstruction of binary gender categories, and the relationship between power and gender identity are discussed. Additionally, gender performativity and passability are explored as essential resources for the existence of transgender individuals.The second chapter delves into the assumptions of the notion of human plurality, based on the studies of Hannah Arendt and Judith Butler. Plurality is presented as the fundamental essence of politics, with the political and ethical implications of this principle being examined. The ethics of cohabitation is discussed as a response to the problem of identity ontology, emphasizing the need to recognize and value the plurality of groups. The denial of human plurality and resistance to a totalitarian logic are addressed, with a focus on totalitarian resistance and the importance of gender plurality.In the third chapter, the relevance of gender for accessing fundamental rights is analyzed, particularly in the context of transgender individuals. Bioethics is discussed in relation to transgender individuals, considering the process of gender transition and its implications, as well as their participation in sports. The difficulties faced by transgender individuals in accessing fundamental rights are highlighted, including the protective deficit within the justice system. Issues such as the right to name, the criminalization of transphobia, and access to social rights are examined as well. The study seeks to understand the challenges faced by transgender individuals in their struggle for the right to fully exist in society. Through a critical analysis, reflections and proposals are presented for greater inclusion and protection of these individuals, recognizing plurality as a fundamental principle that should be respected and valued in all aspects of human life.

The Kantian theory about evil is one of the fields of ethics that most generates conflicts and ambiguous interpretations. In particular, the theory of radical evil is a constant point of conflict for critics and researchers of Kantian philosophy, and many authors consider that it puts the entire edifice of Kant's critical-transcendental philosophy in crisis and, in order to understand this problem, it is necessary to carry out a multifaceted study that encompasses several of his works. If it is assumed that in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals and in the Critique of Practical Reason he investigates what constitutes a moral action, in Religion at the Limits of Simple Reason he investigates the configuration of evil. This last text is primarily responsible for the so-called conflicts of Kantian coherence, since, in addition to being an analysis
philosophy of religion, it is in it that Kant postulates the theory of radical evil. The doctrine of radical evil resides in the human being's claim to be outside the duty of the moral law, to
corrupt and allow an arbitrary motive to be consciously established against the maxim of the moral law, which legislates for itself as a maxim of action, inverting the established universal maxim
in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. That is, evil starts from the singular against the universality of the moral law and takes place when the moral agent establishes an evil maxim.
as a guideline for his actions. However, from the perspective of this project, the problem of evil is directly related to freedom, especially with the validity of free will (freie
Willkür), understanding that, according to his own will, only the free human being, as an agent endowed with a faculty of practical desire, can choose moral evil and, therefore,
Because of this, an inclination towards good and a propensity towards evil is proposed, where Kant seems to defend two untenable ideals. Preliminarily, an innate propensity for evil
does not seem compatible with any notion of freedom. It is from this split that the problem of this research arises. Therefore, the general objective of this project is to understand the complex relationships of the concepts of Freedom and Evil in Kant's critical-transcendental philosophy.

The problem of consciousness continues to trouble many philosophers and some scientists. It is often said that science misses something essential about consciousness, and therefore the former must be reformulated in some way, in order to properly contemplate the phenomenon in question. On other occasions, the problem is supposedly solved by simply eliminating the desideratum. This dissertation defends an alternative approach to these two extremes. Consciousness realism is accepted, but reformism of the science of consciousness is rejected. It is suggested that the scientific approach is inherently limited with respect to consciousness, but this does not imply any fracture in our scientific worldview. That done, we explore what remains for the epistemology of consciousness.

The foundation of mathematics is a question that concerned logicians, mathematicians and philosophers in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. In this debate, the formalist strand emerges as an especially promising alternative. Hilbert's formalism conferred autonomy on mathematics, since his program conceived mathematics as a set of rules. Hilbert's axiomatization increasingly conferred independence of mathematical activity in relation to intuition, evidencing its logical-deductive aspect. Gödel's incompleteness theorems reveal, however, the difficulties of implementing the formalist project, since the incompleteness of arithmetical theories opens a kind of gap between arithmetic rules and truths. In general, Gödel's theorems show that in formal systems such as Russell's and Whitehead's Principia Mathematica, if the arithmetic is consistent it cannot be complete, that is, there are arithmetic statements that cannot be proved or disproved. This leads us to reflect on the philosophical assumptions of foundationalist currents, especially logicism and formalism. In this sense, our objective here was to present the main foundationalist currents of the philosophy of mathematics, that is, logicism, intuitionism and formalism, emphasizing the formalist program. From the consequences for the Hilbertian formalism through the presentation of Gödel's incompleteness theorems, we draw a parallel with the objectives of the functionalist program in the philosophy of mind, thus highlighting relevant aspects of the epistemology of mathematics.

Analysis of the relationship between the recognition theory elaborated by the young Hegel and the development theory of Lev Semionovich Vigotski

Analysis of Marx's critique, from the text Critique of the Philosophy of Right, of Hegel's attempt to think about the unity between State and civil society. Marx's critique of the role of estates, the place of the monarch and the bureaucracy, as well as the function of the representation of deputies in Hegel's Philosophy of Right will be analyzed

The poem O Uraguay, published in Lisbon in 1769, is contextualized in the Portuguese and European Enlightenment, to which it offers an original contribution. The Enlightenment in Portugal had its peak in the reign of D. José I and was characterized by royal absolutism, manifested in the form of enlightened despotism, carried out, in practice, by the Marquis of Pombal. The period was marked by the persecution of the Jesuits and by the reforms of the system and teaching methods in Portugal, in the effort to modernize the country. In this context, the theme of indigenism, under the philosophical bias, which was then debated in other European countries, had no repercussion among Portuguese thinkers. The poet José Basílio da Gama, committed to the propaganda and defense of Pombaline politics, uses his poem for this purpose, but offers a parallel argument, which approaches the pro-indigenist debate, to which he also offers an original contribution. The Brazilian Indian presented in O Uraguay is neither superior nor inferior to civilized man, as European philosophers questioned, he is equal in courage and rational capacity. In O Uraguay, the Indian argues with natural reason against the King's representative, who uses reason of state to justify his colonialist action. In this way, by valuing the figure of the Brazilian Indian and his native culture, placed in confrontation with the European invader, the poet inserted Portugal in the philosophical debate of pro-indigenism, offered an original contribution to this debate, and valued the figure of the Indian as a Brazilian man, endowed with a sense of belonging to the land and a legitimate defender of his ancestral culture.

The aim of this research is to address theoretical aspects that guide the thinking of French philosopher Henri Bergson, initially investigating the type of metaphysics he intends to elaborate in his texts and which ontological assumptions operate behind the Bergsonian conception of intuition. For this, we will seek to clarify Bergson's view of what duration is and the differentiation he gives us in relation to time and space. Another important element explored in the research is Bergson's conception of intelligence and conceptual thinking as elements restricted to outer spatial reality and, therefore, incapable of apprehending duration. We will seek to understand what kind of knowledge this intuition really is that gives us access to this deeper and more original dimension of being and is capable of going beyond what has to do with the intellectual faculty, and also, how should we understand this access of intuition to the background of being. Throughout the master's dissertation, we will follow Bergson's reflections on the moral organization of societies, as well as the concept he attributes to religion and mysticism, in a dualism that can favor or bring difficulties to reach the intuitive experience. The intuitive method pointed out by the philosopher promises to solve the problem by putting Man in contact with the deep Self, in motion and in full evolution, giving life the original attention it deserves. Finally, we will seek in the philosopher's thought the possibility of a language that is capable of expressing what is discovered through the exercise of intuition.

The purpose of this dissertation is to analyze the constitutive elements of the foundation of modern political bodies in Hannah Arendt's thought, which took place within the French and American revolutions. The author exposes in her work On Revolution (2006) the complexity of the process of formation of new political bodies that diverge from the aristocratic models dominated by tyranny. According to Arendt's perspective, the phenomenon of revolution broke through the flow of the continuum of History and, in this way, possibilities for new formulations within the scope of political activities were presented. In the first chapter of the dissertation, we will identify what the thinker understands as the meaning of the phenomenon of revolution, as well as its inherent aspects, namely freedom, the social question, the transformations accompanied by modernity, and the character of novelty. In the second chapter, we will deal with issues related to political experiences and readings that Arendt relates to the moment of the revolution and the foundation of political bodies, as well as her interpretation of the constitutive elements of the revolution, such as Declarations of rights and Constitutions. In this chapter it will also be analyzed the widely agreed first foundation and the search on both sides of the Atlantic to find this foundation, reflected in the question of the absolute. Following up, in the last chapter, we will highlight Arendt's formulations about what ended up being founded from the revolutionary phenomena of the 18th century, what she delineates as the lost treasure of revolutions and, in the end, her legacy left for later generations. Therefore, through this path, we intend to facilitate the understanding of the relationship between revolution and politics.

In view of Foucault’s insistence that power relations do not happen without counter-response, this dissertation proposes to problematize the relationship between government and resistance in the author’s writings. Considering that “government” also refers to rationalized and institutionalized practices of power, as well as any way of conducting the conduct of self and others, it is possible to discern an important role and a close link between critical attitude and parrhēsía  in the history of governmentality. Therefore, our work aims to answer the following question: regarding that critical attitude and parrhēsía constitute a philosophical éthos in the history of governmentality, what is the relationship between critical éthos and parrhesiastic éthos and how is this relationship established? We hypothesize that the link between critical éthos and parrhesiastic éthos is in the production of practices of freedom that make it possible to create forms of resistance to the excess of governmentality. Secondly, critique and parrhesia allow Foucault to think of philosophy itself as a tool we can use to interrogate the moment in which we live. It can be concluded that critical éthos and parrhesiastic éthos merge in the production of forms of resistance and the realization of an ontology of the present.

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This project aims to describe the difficulty to assess the consciousness described in the B section of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit (PhG) named self-consciousness. The schedule we will follow to achieve our goals are: 1 – To define what Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit (PhG) is and demonstrates the philosophy’s dialectical method, contextualizing Hegel’s thoughts regarding german idealism and the meaning of what phenomenology is. 2 – Explain section A of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit (PhG) and also appoint the figure of the Invisible assurance, its belief, movements and what it leads to a contradiction; exposing the Perception’s formation, its movements and how Perception’s figure truth is incorrect. Finally, it’ll be explained the figure of Understanding, its knowledge, search, and how, from its development, consciousness perceives itself as self-consciousness. 3 – Describe what self-consciousness is and the problem of the acknowledgment between the consciousness, considering that initially, it shows how a “Pure being”, is then, aware of itself through elevating the other and also having the redoubled reflection that is placed in another. This means, we will clarify the first acknowledgment between the consciousness it is built from the relationship of not implementing the concept of acknowledging oneself succeeding the etic act on the display of freedom consciousness of itself: stoicism, skepticism, and the unhappy conscience, as dialectic movement contrary to slavery.